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The US recession of – is one of the deepest on record. Yet it did not produce a global depression –
quite unlike . According to the standard view, this reflected an unfettering of central banking after
the collapse of the international gold standard circa . We challenge this view. While Germany and a
couple of Central and Eastern European countries were sheltered by binding exchange controls, most
countries were still constrained by their golden fetters, as our new exchange rate regime classification
suggests. The underlying policy regime was surprisingly similar to that of the – downturn.
What mattered was a quick reversal in US policy in  and, for many countries, a more plentiful
stock of international reserves.
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Between the summer of  and the spring of  the US economy experienced
the steepest slump in its history. Industrial production fell by more than  per cent,
the stock market index dropped by nearly  per cent, and the unemployment rate
increased from  to  per cent.2 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
alarmed by the quick reversal after August , noted that US industrial production
‘showed an almost vertical drop’which was ‘greater than in the autumn of ’ (BIS
, p. ). And with the US economy still being the largest economy of the world,
the impact was immediately felt all over the world. According to the BIS the decline
in some countries outside the US was ‘so marked that a parallel can be found only in
the most acute depressions ever known’ (BIS , p. ). The world, many contem-
poraries feared, was on the brink of another economic disaster. Yet, while the dra-
matic fall of US industrial production sent shockwaves across the world, the global
recession proved to be surprisingly mild. The decline of world GDP in 
1 The authors wish to thank Valpy Fitzgerald, Matthias Morys, Alexander Rathke, Catherine Schenk,
discussants at the exchange-rate-regimes panels at the Lund  and Utrecht World Economic
History Conferences, and three anonymous referees.
2 On the causes of the  recession see Roose (), Friedman and Schwarz (), Cole and
Ohanian (), Meltzer (), Eggertsson and Pugsley () and Velde ().
21
Financial History Review . (), pp. –. © European Association for Banking and Financial History e.V. 
doi:./S
amounted to only . per cent compared to . per cent in . The US recession
had its impact, but the fear of another depression proved overly pessimistic. Recovery
was in full swing by the end of .
Why were the global repercussions of the US slump in  less severe than in
? The standard view is that all major countries had abandoned the gold standard
and enjoyedmore policy freedom. Accordingly, Germany and Japan were shielded by
tight capital controls and therefore able to maintain their high level of defence spend-
ing, Britain could start a big rearmament programme and absorb the deflationary
shock of the US economy thanks to its floating exchange rate regime, and a
number of other countries, namely in Europe and Latin America, reacted to the
US slump by introducing capital controls or letting their currencies depreciate
(Eichengreen , pp. –).
This article challenges the standard view.While it is beyond doubt that Germany and
a couple of Central and Eastern European countries were in fact able to protect them-
selves by maintaining or imposing tight capital controls, most countries were still con-
strained by their golden fetters. Britain and the sterling bloc as well as a number of small
countries did not have much room for manoeuvre when the US recession affected the
world economy. Most members of the sterling bloc – in particular Australia and India –
defended and kept their sterling parities while in – they had devalued their cur-
rencies. Neither was the British rearmament programme too big to violate the rules of
the gold standard. Additionally, the fact that some Latin American countries let their
currencies weaken is not an argument for a reformed international monetary system;
they had pursued the same exchange-rate policy in –.
We obtain supporting results from a de facto classification of exchange-rate regimes
during the interwar years, tests on the effectiveness of capital controls and a descriptive
analysis of British fiscal policy in the s. The classification suggests that most
countries in the s quickly returned to fixed exchange-rate regimes after halting
gold convertibility. They had broken their golden fetters in order to devalue their
currencies, not to abandon the gold standard altogether. Germany is an exception,
not a typical case; most countries with capital controls loosened them over the
course of the decade, in part because they did not have the means to enforce them
(Gordon ). The global reserve position improved thanks to large-scale devalua-
tions of all major currencies and their major trading partners between  and .
This article has implications for the conventional view of the international monet-
ary system of the interwar years. The s should be viewed as a key link between the
gold standard and Bretton Woods rather than a temporary digression from fixed
exchange rates. The  agreement in New Hampshire codified what had already
become common practice in the s. From a longer-term viewpoint, floating cur-
rencies based on fiat money would have to await the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system in the early s. This was the key twentieth-century paradigm shift in the
international monetary system.
The article has five parts. Section I discusses parallels and differences between
– and – in the US and at the global level and summarises the standard
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view of why there was no global recession in . Sections II and III present our
classification scheme of exchange-rate regimes and capital controls, illustrated by
some country examples. Section IV discusses the British case by comparing the
freedom of fiscal policy under the classical gold standard and in the late s. The
concluding section highlights implications for the history of the international monet-
ary system between the gold exchange standard and Bretton Woods.
I
In early , the outlook for the world economy could not have been better. The
BIS observed in its annual report that ‘for the first time since the beginning of
the depression practically every important sphere of business has been brought into
the upward movement’ (BIS , p. ).World industrial production and the physical
volume of global trade had finally approached the level of  (Lary , pp. 
and ). Also, the threat of deflation had become much weaker. In , world
prices for food and raw materials had increased for the first time since the beginning
of the crisis, and world prices for manufactures were at least not falling anymore
(Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo , p. ). And finally, tensions within the inter-
national monetary system had become less serious since the devaluation of the French,
Dutch and Swiss currencies and the conclusion of the Tripartite Agreement in
September .
Just as the sense of relief was growing, the US economy experienced a severe
setback. From July  to May  industrial production declined by  per
cent, the Dow Jones Industrial Average by  per cent.3 And as the economic con-
traction immediately affected the labour market – the unemployment rate jumped
from  to  per cent – the ruling Democrats were promptly punished in the
mid-term elections of November .4 For the first time since  they lost seats
both in the House of Representatives and the Senate (Freidel , p. ). The
unexpected economic downturn proved to be a huge burden for the Roosevelt
administration and its New Deal agenda.
The breakdown of economic activity between the summer of  and the spring
of  was even more dramatic than during the first phase of the Great Depression.
As noted, industrial production contracted by  per cent, whereas its decline
between the summer of  and the spring of  amounted to only  per cent
(Figure ; Freidel ). ‘In the fall of ’, a contemporary observer wrote, ‘indus-
trial production began the sharpest drop on record, and by the end of the year most of
the increase from the middle of  had been wiped out’ (Lary , p. ).
3 We followVelde () who prefers the traditional seasonally adjustedNBER data over theMiron and
Romer () data. For both data series see Carter et al. (, table Cb-, pp. – ff.); Romer
(, p. ): peak :, through :.
4 NBER Macrohistory: mab: UK Insured Workers Unemployed /-/,
/-/.
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Likewise, the fall of the Dow Jones Industrial Average was more accentuated in
–, although the crash of October  has been memorised as one of the
worst crises in the entire history of Wall Street.5
The causes of the recession are not entirely clear. One view is that a combination of
fiscal contraction and monetary tightening had a devastating effect on business and
consumer confidence against the background of a still fragile recovery.6 Another
view highlights rising labour costs following the Wagner Act of  which curtailed
the means of employers in their actions against labour unions (Cole and Ohanian
). In a similar vein, the BIS observed in  that there can be ‘no doubt that
the rise in costs of production was one of the main causes of the precipitous
decline in industrial activity of the United States during the second half of ’
(BIS , p. ).
It is beyond the reach of this article to provide a sweeping discussion of this debate.7
It is clear, however, that starting in the third quarter of , monetary policy had at
least some negative effect. As the rise of wholesale prices had accelerated, there was a
growing sense among the Board of Governors that a new speculative bubble was in
the making, similar to the one that occurred in the second half of the s. The
Roosevelt administration supported the Fed by issuing public statements warning
Figure . Industrial production (July  = )
Source: Federal Reserve Board. Seasonally adjusted.
5 NBER Macrohistory: mb: US Industrial Stock Price Index, Dow-Jones /-/.
6 See e.g. Friedman and Schwarz (). For Romer () the  episode ‘provides a cautionary tale’.
For a summary of monetary and fiscal policies of the US in the s see Fishback ().
7 See Velde () for a survey on the literature. In a new book Field () stresses the exceptional
growth of potential output. We focus on the short-term fluctuations.
SCOTT URBAN AND TOBIAS STRAUMANN
of inflation. From August  to May , the central bank gradually increased
reserve requirements for banks in order to reduce the high level of excess reserves
which was considered as a potential source of future inflation.8 Moreover, in
December , the US Treasury decided to sterilise gold inflows. Gold sterilisation
led to a reduction of the money stock, and the increase of reserve requirements
induced banks to curtail their financing of firms, ‘with visible effects on interest rates’
(Velde , p. ). In , fiscal policy also became less expansionary. An increase
in income tax rates, the beginning of the Social Security taxation and the introduction
of a tax on undistributed profits raised revenues, while an early payout of bonuses to
World War I veterans before the elections of  reduced spending. Altogether, gov-
ernment expenditure contracted by . per cent of GDP.9 As John Maynard Keynes
wrote to an American friend in November , ‘it should have been obvious that,
as soon as the Government began spending less, and as soon as the pace of improvement
was somewhat moderated, a setback was entirely inevitable’.10
As far as recovery is concerned, there is a broad scholarly consensus. In early ,
the US authorities changed gears and initiated expansionary policies. At the end of
February, the Treasury ended the gold sterilisation programme. In April, Roosevelt
announced a lowering of reserve requirements and a large increase in spending.
Again, the communication towards the public was loud and open. At a press confer-
ence in mid-February , President Roosevelt explained ‘that achievement of per-
manent prosperity depends on raising general price levels to those prevailing in ’.
The Chicago Daily Tribune, for example, ran a headline on page  saying ‘Hope
Inflation Will Halt Depression’. Three days later, Roosevelt repeated his call for
inflation.11 In the summer of , the downward trend was quickly reversed.
Industrial production and prices began to rise again.
Whatever the exact causes, they clearly differed from those initiating the contrac-
tion starting in the late s.12 Nevertheless, as in –, the immediate conse-
quences for the world economy were the same, namely a sharp reduction of world
demand and world prices of raw materials. US real imports fell  per cent in both
shocks (measured peak-to-trough in each -month interval).13 Real global com-
modity prices dropped  per cent peak-to-trough in the months of – com-
pared to  per cent (peak-to-trough) in the months of –.14 The economic
8 In a recent paper Calomiris, Mason and Wheelock () dispute the contractionary effect stemming
from the doubling of reserve requirements.
9 Eichengreen (), p. , and Romer () on the fiscal lessons of .
10 Keynes to W. W. Stewart,  November, in Moggridge (), p. .
11 Eggertsson and Pugsley () provide quantitative data on the policy reversal of , pp. –.
12 The literature on the causes of the great depression is huge. Classic contributions are Temin (),
Bernanke and James (), Eichengreen (), James ().
13 US imports sourced from League of Nations,Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (various issues), deflated by
US CPI (source: US Bureau of Labor).
14 Economist Global Commodity Price Dollar Index (source: Global Financial Data), deflated by US
CPI (source: US Bureau of Labor).
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situation of countries outside the US was further complicated by the reversal of capital
movements. While in the last quarter of  and in the first two quarters of 
investors exported  million US dollars from the US, almost the same amount of
capital ( million dollars) returned in the third and fourth quarter of  when
economic growth outside the US slowed down (BIS /, p.  and BIS
/, pp. ,  and ). The reversal of capital movements was also precipitated
by growing political tensions in Europe. Similarly, in – countries outside the
US had been confronted with capital outflows.
In both episodes, the Federal Reserve was required to cover  per cent of its notes
with gold. It is clear that this covering statute did not constitute a policy constraint in
the  crisis – gold inflows up to this point had pushed the level of ‘active’ gold (i.e.
gold beyond that needed to cover notes) to a record high of nearly . billion dollars,
with the Treasury sterilising gold accumulations (Brockie , p. ). Regarding
the – episode, the  per cent cover requirement is more contentious. The
New York Fed’s gold holdings were at times uncomfortably near the  per cent
minimum, which some see as limiting the Fed’s room of manoeuvre, since it was
not willing to jeopardise the gold standard (Eichengreen , p. ). Others
argue that the Fed could have initiated an expansionary policy (including lender-
of-last-resort) without upsetting the dollar’s peg to gold (Hsieh and Romer ).
Yet, in contrast to , the world economy experienced only a mild recession in
. Real GDP declined by . per cent against . per cent in  (Figure ).15
Focusing on the world economy outside the US shows that real GDP in  even
grew slightly by . per cent against −. per cent in . In addition, we observe
a large divergence on the country level, whereas in  all major economies were
entering a recession. Germany, then the second largest capitalist economy of the
world ( per cent of US GDP), grew by . per cent, whereas in  it had
shrunk by . per cent. Britain, the third largest capitalist economy, did better in
 (+. per cent) than in , although the recession of  had not been par-
ticularly severe (−. per cent). Of the large European economies only France experi-
enced negative GDP growth (−. per cent), but far less than in  (−. per cent).
Real import data show that most countries were more reluctant to transmit the US
shock to their domestic economies in – than in –. Figure  reports the
percentage of year-on-year declines in real imports for a -month period in each
downturn centred on the peak of US industrial production, seasonally adjusted, by
country. Only Switzerland and Chile had a higher incidence of falling real imports
in the – cycle compared to –. Conversely, because the world outside
the US maintained a relatively high level of imports, American exports declined by
only  per cent in  against  per cent in . Clearly, an accommodating
stance in most large economies prevented a further contraction of world demand.
How can we explain that the large European economies and Japan chose to
cushion the demand and price shock stemming from the collapse of US industrial
15 Calculation based on Maddison ().
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Figure . Growth of real GDP  vs : Britain, France, Germany, United States
Source: Maddison ().
Note: World* means world without Spain.
Figure . Probability of annual decline in real imports in two recessions
Sources: Imports are from League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook (various years) in local currency
terms, deflated by national consumer price indices from Global Financial Data.
Note: Each point reports year-on-year decline in imports during a -month period centred
on the peak of the US industrial production index (seasonally adjusted), as a percentage of all
observations (usually ). For example, nearly % of monthly observations of imports for
Germany in the first recession were year-on-year declines, whereas fewer than % of
German import observations in the second recession were declines.
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production? According to the standard view in the literature, the accommodating
policy reaction was due to a shift in the international monetary system. While in
– most countries were disciplined by the gold exchange standard, countries
were freed from their golden fetters in – and able to depreciate their currencies
and run large fiscal deficits in order to finance their rearmament. ‘Liberated from the
gold standard’, Barry Eichengreen argues, ‘other countries were not forced to match
deflationary policies in the United States with their own deflationary initiatives. There
was little tightening of monetary conditions outside the United States’ (Eichengreen
, p. ).16 Thanks to this freedom, Britain was able to issue a great loan to start an
armament programme in , a quarter of it financed by bonds, and Germany and
Japan could maintain their high level of defence spending during the crisis. ‘Military
spending would not have been possible had these countries still been on gold’
(p. ).
Furthermore, instead of tightening monetary policy France and Japan let their cur-
rencies depreciate as they were losing gold to the United States. Likewise, several Latin
American countries allowed their currencies to depreciate or tightened their exchange
controls. This latter strategy was also chosen by some Central and Eastern European
countries when their current account deficits widened. And finally, the currencies of
the sterling bloc becameweaker against the dollar in the second half of , offsetting
the deflationary effect of the US recession. Eichengreen concedes that other factors
may have played a contributing role, notably the quick reversal of US policies and
the stimulus of rapidly rising military spending around the world. ‘But the central
factor is surely that it was no longer necessary for other countries to fight fire with
fire – to meet deflation with deflation. It was only possible for them to pursue
more expansionary policies than those of the United States because they had been
freed from their golden fetters’ (, p. )
In the following sections we will challenge this view on three grounds. First, our
exchange-rate-regime classification suggests that most countries were pegging their
currencies in – as they did in –. It is true that the Latin American
countries let their currencies depreciate, but they had done the same in –,
and some countries, such as Australia, even maintained their parities in contrast to
–. Second, while there is no doubt that Germany was able to insulate itself
thanks to tight exchange controls, most countries had rather porous capital controls
in place. And third, the British rearmament programme was consistent with the
rules of the gold standard.
Before proceeding, we need to treat the issue of trade openness. A stylised view of
the s holds that by , global trade (a) was smaller than in  and (b) had
balkanised into semi-autarkic trading ‘blocs’, where a shock in one might not
impact the rest. We acknowledge that trade volume was smaller in the – reces-
sion than in –, but only by about  per cent in real terms (Eichengreen and
Irwin , p. ). Second, rather than being a novelty, the ‘balkanisation’ of s
16 See also Eichengreen (), p. .
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trade is seen in recent literature as extending a pattern from the gold standard and even
before (Ritschl and Wolf ; Eichengreen and Irwin ).
I I
Flexibility in the exchange-rate regime was not the main source of relief from the
– downturn. The BIS at the time remarked that ‘the extent to which the
world’s exchange position deteriorated during the year should not be exaggerated’
(BIS , p. ). The BIS referred in particular to the sterling dollar rate: ‘Over
the year  the exchange value of sterling declined by ½ per cent, but even so
the sterling–dollar rate was kept generally within about  per cent of the old par,
while inside the sterling area itself no single defection occurred.’
In fact, from the outbreak of the US recession in June  to June  when
Roosevelt had already changed course, the dollar rate of sterling remained completely
stable, while overall UK exports declined by  per cent. It was only in the second half
of  that sterling depreciated . per cent against the dollar. In this period US
imports increased at a fast rate. It would be hard to argue that the UK was able to
cushion the US shock for the sterling area thanks to its flexible exchange rate
against the dollar.
The League of Nations Yearbook / includes a table of  countries which,
having left the gold standard, re-pegged their currency.17 We see this tabulation as a
contemporary acknowledgement of pegging. However, it does not go far enough.
Some pegs are not reported; others are reported as adopted at dates beyond what
we would consider a reasonable standard of pegging. The literature on de facto
exchange-rate-regime classification offers a number of algorithms for inferring an
exchange rate peg. While a review is beyond the scope of this article, a differentiating
feature in the literature is the basis for judgement (Calvo and Reinhart ).
Classification algorithms can measure exchange-rate outcomes, exchange-rate inten-
tions, or both.18 We adopt the outcome-based algorithm of Urban (), which is
very close to that of Shambaugh (). The differences between them are () Urban
uses weekly rather than monthly observations and () Urban codes every observation
on a rolling basis, whereas Shambaugh codes on a year-by-year basis. We code an
observation as pegged if the current plus future  weeks lie within a ± percentage
point band. As in Shambaugh (), this is defined as the difference between the
maximum and minimum of the log of the exchange rate, which must not exceed
.. As in Shambaugh (), we accommodate a one-time peg change as consistent
with a pegged regime, if the prior six months ( weeks) and following six months
17 League of Nations (), p. : ‘Currencies maintained de facto in fixed relation to another
currency.’
18 Outcomes are descriptive statistics of the exchange rate; intentions are descriptive statistics of policy
variables, typically international reserves and/or the policy interest rate. See Urban ().
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exhibit less than  per cent weekly changes.19 Details of our coding algorithm are
available from the authors.
Having considered a variety of numeraires (the US dollar, UK pound sterling and
French franc), it is clear that, outside the sterling bloc, most authorities are in fact
pegging to gold.20 We therefore report a gold exchange rate index for each
country, which tracks movement of the local currency against the dollar from 
up to  inclusive, the French franc from  to  inclusive, and the dollar
from  till  August . For those interested in comparing dollar-pegging to
sterling-pegging in the s, this gold index should be interpreted as a dollar-
peg.21 In Appendix , we report the results of our peg tests. This appendix reports
the countries which pegged to sterling and those which pegged to the dollar (the
gold index). There are  exchange-rate regimes in the dataset: Algeria, Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
HK, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
UK, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
Figure  reports the percentage of observations coded as pegged per year, stacked by
gold-convertibility. ‘Pre-gold’ are observations for regimes prior to taking up the gold
standard and regimes, like Spain’s and China’s, which never took up the gold stan-
dard. ‘Post-gold’ are regimes which have left the gold standard.22 The algorithm
picks the appropriate peg for each -week period: an observation is coded
‘pegged’ if the peg criteria are met using either the gold index or the exchange rate
against sterling. This is an appropriate algorithmic choice: it allows the data to
speak for itself and we agree with Shambaugh () that a float is unlikely to mas-
querade as a peg if it meets the -week ± per cent corridor criterion.
Floating seems to have existed only before adoption of the gold standard, mostly
occurring immediately after World War I. Afterwards, there was essentially one
exchange-rate regime: pegged. Gold convertibility is a separate matter. Countries
which went off gold did not move to a float. The dollar’s devaluation in 
caused much disruption, but by  pegging was as common as at the peak of the
gold standard.
19 In Shambaugh (), a one-off peg adjustment is allowed if the  other monthly observations
during the year have zero per cent change. We follow the less-than-% approach due to the finer
granularity of our data.
20 Our bilateral exchange rate data are from Global Financial Data and we derive the necessary cross-
rates.
21 See Eichengreen and Flandreau () on the relative status of the dollar and sterling as international
currencies in the s.
22 Coding for gold convertibility follows Officer () by year. Within-year, the start of gold convert-
ibility is defined as the final observation of % or greater change in the USD exchange rate. The end
date of gold convertibility is taken from League of Nations (), p. .
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It is true that capital controls were a new feature of the post-gold-standard regimes.
Were they responsible for cushioning the shock emanating from the US in
/? According to Gordon (), exchange controls could be either ‘mild’ or
‘severe’, the former characterised by ‘a general supervision of applications to purchase
foreign exchange’ (Gordon , p. ). These mild controls were adopted by the
UK, Finland, USA, Belgium, Luxembourg and, until January , Japan and,
until May , Italy. ‘Severe’ regulations ‘required the surrender of foreign balances
accruing from exports’. These included Austria, Germany, Hungary, Argentina, Italy,
Ecuador, Poland, Portugal, Chile, Bulgaria, Uruguay and Denmark. Gordon notes,
however, that ‘outside of Germany, Italy and Japan, a substantial degree of relaxation
of exchange control had been achieved’ by the mid-s (, p. ). This suggests
that capital controls for the majority of countries offered weak protection from the
/ shock.
Using League of Nations coding for exchange restrictions, Obstfeld, Shambaugh
and Taylor find that central banks after  follow a blended Franco-US interest
rate regardless of exchange-control status (Obstfeld et al. , p. ).23 Using a
similar coding source, we break down our sample into open- and closed-capital
Figure . Pegged coding, percentage of annual observations, automatic numeraire
Source: Urban ().
Notes: *Truncated at //. The bars report the percentage of observations in 
countries in  weeks per year which qualify as pegged on modified Shambaugh ()
criteria. Shadings represent gold convertibility.
23 Their coding source for the s is League of Nations, Monetary Review (), p. .
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account regimes, repeat our exchange-rate-regime classification algorithm, and
explore the matter further by looking at countries singly.24 Figure  reports gold-
pegging countries’ base-rate co-movement with a gold interest rate.25 Hungary’s
base rate, for example, follows closely on the gold interest rate irrespective of gold
convertibility. Hungary suspended the gold standard in the week of  July .
Our algorithm shows it pegging the exchange rate to gold until switching to sterling
in the week of  March . Its central bank interest rate is consistent with this
policy.26
Figure . Central bank discount rates, gold-pegging observations
Source: Global Financial Data.
Note: The graph shows the local central bank discount rate plotted against a Franco-US hybrid
interest rate (‘GOLD rate’). The plots are limited to observations for which the country is
identified as pegging to a gold-hybrid exchange rate in the period –.
24 Our source for exchange controls is League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook / (Geneva, ), pp.
–: ‘Measures affecting exchange rates, Legal value of currencies and the valuation of gold
reserves.’ In , % of observations are exchange-controlled, rising to % by .
25 Whereas Obstfeld et al. () take the average of US and French interest rate changes in the –,
our gold interest rate time series is the US rate until . Thereafter it is proportionately modified by
the change in the French interest rate to end , and thereafter by the change in the US interest rate.
26 Please see Appendix I for the dates of gold convertibility and currency pegging in our dataset.
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Cointegration tests suggested by Johansen (), carried out in Stata, cannot reject
the null hypothesis of at least one cointegrating relationship between the local dis-
count rate and the gold interest rate for all of the gold-pegging countries except
Chile, for country-specific timespans that encompass the gold standard and the
post-gold period.
Testing capital mobility within the sterling bloc cannot be done on the basis of dis-
count rate changes as the UK Bank rate was essentially unchanging frommid-, at
 per cent. We therefore assess the openness of sterling-peg capital accounts by the
volatility of their reserve holdings. If reserve volatility increases under periods of
market stress, it can be inferred that reserves are being deployed to defend the peg;
the greater the use of reserves, the less effective is the protection conferred by
exchange controls. Figure  reports the coefficient of variation of reserve holdings
of sterling-peg countries (as identified by our classification algorithm). The compara-
tor is Germany, which had an unambiguously unconvertible currency. At the peak of
market stress, in –, almost all sterling-bloc reserves volatility observations exceed
Germany’s.
Thus, even though some countries officially maintained exchange controls, they
were not able to pursue an independent monetary policy. A case in point is
Denmark. According to the classification by the League of Nations, the Danish auth-
orities had introduced capital controls as early as . Yet Denmark, as pointed out
by Nurkse (), inflated the economy behind the protection of exchange controls,
while pegging to sterling at the beginning of the decade (Nurkse , pp. –).
Because its controls were easily evaded on the current account, the decline in reserves
by  forced the authorities to tighten policy. In other words: it had to sacrifice
Figure . Reserves coefficient of variation, percentage
Source: Reserves are transcribed from Federal Reserve Bulletin (various issues).
Note: The data are truncated at % c.v., which excludes Germany in –.
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policy independence in order to maintain its peg to sterling; capital controls were too
weak to protect the peg.
We argue that capital controls played a minor role in cushioning the US shock in
–. They were relevant for the monetary policy of Japan, Germany, and a
number of Central and Eastern countries entertaining close trade relations with
Germany.27 There must have been additional reasons why the world economy did
not suffer from a severe recession in  as it had in . We now turn to the
UK to explore these additional factors.
IV
The UK did not impose tight capital controls (like Germany) nor did it resort to a
substantial depreciation of its currency (like France) to cushion the demand and
price shock originating from the US in the second half of . Accordingly, the
crisis was immediately felt across the Atlantic. Between the summer of  and
the summer of  UK industrial production declined by  per cent, wholesale
prices dropped by more than  per cent, and the number of unemployed insured
workers increased from  to  per cent. The reduction of industrial production
in – was almost identical to that in –. Nevertheless, the economy as a
whole maintained a positive growth rate of . per cent in , while in  it
had shrunk by . per cent.
According to Eichengreen (), the drop in foreign demandwas compensated by
a large increase in defence spending which would not have been possible under the
gold standard. There is no disagreement with regard to the first part of Eichengreen’s
argument. As Table  shows, government spending in  and  increased by
£ million and £ million respectively, reaching a record level of £
million. Rising expenditure on rearmament was the main driver: in  defence
spending rose by £ million and in  by £ million to a total of £
million (all figures are in  prices) (Thomas , p. ).28 ‘In the absence of rear-
mament’, writes Mark Thomas, ‘the  recession would have bit harder and deeper
into the gains in employment and output made over the previous five years’ (Thomas
, p. ).
The second part of Eichengreen’s argument, however, appears to overstate the
constraints of the gold standard. In , defence expenditure accounted for less
than  per cent of GNP (compared to  per cent in Germany), and the current
account deficit deteriorated only slightly by £million to £million.29 In addition,
the UK’s reserve position was much better than in –. The gold reserves of the
27 On the formation of currency blocs along trading patterns see Ritschl and Wolf (), Eichengreen
and Irwin (), Wandschneider and Wolf ().
28 Figures from March to March.
29 Thomas (, p. ). Current account figures from Mitchell (), British Historical Statistics,
p. .
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Table 1. UK national expenditure accounts
Consumers’
expenditure
Public
authorities’
current ex-
penditure on
goods and
services
Of which:
estimated annual
expenditure on
rearmament
Gross
domestic
fixed capital
formation
Value of
physical
increase of
stocksa
Exports
less
importsb
Gross
domestic
product at
market
prices
Net
property
income
from
abroad
Gross
national
product at
market
prices
        
        
     −   
    − −   
     −   
     − −   
      −   
      −   
     − −   
      −   
      −   
Notes: Figures of estimated annual expenditure on rearmament from March to March, deflated by authors.
aIncluding work in progress.
bIncluding services and re-exports.
Source: Mitchell (, p. ); data on rearmament Thomas (, pp. –).
S
T
IL
L
T
IE
D
B
Y
G
O
L
D
E
N
F
E
T
T
E
R
S


Bank of England and the Exchange Equalisation Account in  were nearly six
times higher than in , while notes in circulation had increased by only a third.
The improved relation between gold and paper money was highly relevant.
Summarising the position of central banks and the international gold and capital
movements, the BIS noted in spring : ‘Abandonment of the gold standard has
not meant the abandonment of gold either as a means of settling balances between
different countries or as the usual backing for the domestic circulation according to
the cover regulations of central banks.’30 The rearmament programme was clearly
consistent with the rules of the gold standard.
Why did the British current account deficit in  not widen significantly in spite
of the rearmament programme? The comparison shows that the decline of British
exports was half as large in  (%) as in  (%), while imports decreased
by the same percentage in both periods (%). Given that US import demand
dropped much more in  (%) than in  (%), this difference is surprising.
The classification of British exports according to country, however, provides a clear
answer. Two factors were crucial: the quick recovery of exports to the US and
strong import demand of the UK’s major trading partners, namely Germany and
most members of the sterling bloc, notably Australia and India.
As for the quick reversal of the US economy, we have already described how the
Roosevelt administration changed course in . With US industrial production
recovering in the third quarter, UK exports bounced back so that at the end of the
year total exports to the US reached £ million compared to £ million in
. By contrast, in , as US imports continued to decline in the second half
of the year, UK exports to the US dropped from £ to  million, with the differ-
ence amounting to  per cent of total export losses in  compared to 
(Table ).
The second stabilising factor was the high level of import demand of Germany and
the members of the sterling bloc, notably Australia and India (Table ). As already
mentioned, the rapid expansion of the German economy was due to an acceleration
of defence spending made possible by tight capital controls. As for Australia and India,
the high level of import demand was maintained in spite of high capital mobility, a
pegged exchange rate and a widening gap in the trade deficit due to falling prices
for raw materials. The reason for the strong import demand was the improved
reserve position. Figure  reports the level of reserves in December preceding the
peak of US industrial production in each cycle, as a ratio to the average monthly
import bill. Both Australia and India had significantly improved their reserve position
between  and .
The support for aggregate demand in the – downturn reflects a variety of
sources – in some cases, as noted, it includes sustained import demand among trade
partners. In other cases, central banks actively acquired domestic assets to keep base
money supply from contracting, or indeed to expand it. Figure  reports the
30 BIS (), p. . The estimation of UK gold reserves is in the same volume on p. .
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expansion of base money during the -month – US downturn and the 
months beginning with the US – downturn. It is important to compare like
with like in terms of the time period because part of our argument is that the
brevity of the – downturn was part of the reason for the global resilience,
vis-à-vis the much longer – US downturn.
Figure . Reserves, months of import coverage
Source: League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook (various years).
Note: Each data point reports the number of months of imports covered by reserves, based on
the average monthly import bill of the year. The scale is logarithmic.
Table 2. Major export markets of the UK and total UK exports (current prices)
Australia Germany India USA Total
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Source: Mitchell ().
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International liquidity was simply greatly improved at the time of the –
downturn compared to –. This is clear in terms of import cover, as in
Figure , and it is clear in terms of absolute quantity of global reserves, measured in
constant terms, as in Figure , which distinguishes between countries that had restric-
tive capital-account convertibility and those with open capital-account
convertibility.31
The importance of increased reserves was highlighted by a contemporary study by
the US Department of Commerce (Lary ). This study also pointed out that
exchange rate flexibility mattered only for some Latin American countries, but not
for most European countries:
In countries permitting greater freedom of transactions the ability to follow policies of expan-
sion in face of the contraction in the United States … was the result of two factors: () The
enhanced position of their reserves, reflecting the expansion in production and value of
gold and their generally stronger balance-of-payments position in the middle thirties,
enabled many countries to endure a prolonged drain before taking measures to counteract
the loss; () inasmuch as most countries had not reestablished their currencies at fixed gold
parities, they were generally free to absorb part of the external pressure by allowing their cur-
rencies to depreciate. (Yet) the United Kingdom, France and other European countries did
not experience any downward pressure on their reserves and exchange rates, which rather
tended to rise. But the currencies of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and most other Latin
Figure . Expansion of base money over two recessions
Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin, League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Economist.
Note: Data points are reported in Appendix .
31 In accordance with League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook / (), pp. –: ‘Measures affect-
ing exchange rates, Legal value of currencies and the valuation of gold reserves’.
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American countries … depreciated sharply after the recession in the United States began and
remained low in the following two years (Lary , pp. –).
Figure  reports the peak-to-trough decline in reserves in the US downturn interval
(May  – June ) for our sample of  countries with balance-sheet data. These
are compared with the extent of the depreciation of the exchange rate over the same
interval.
Our argument is that a higher degree of international liquidity among central banks
(i.e. larger levels of reserves) allowed countries to weather the – US recession
without inducing their own contractions, as would be required under the conditions
of a currency peg and (relatively) open international accounts. It bears noting that this
point holds regardless of the status of statutory requirements for minimum gold
backing of base money; these only shift the level of reserves needed to defend the
peg.32
V
Why was the global downturn following the sharp US recession of – much
milder than in ? This article discussed the conventional explanation focusing
on the new international monetary environment allowing more exchange rate
Figure . Mean reserves in millions of  US dollars
Source: Urban ().
Note: The y-axis is reserves of gold and foreign exchange in  US dollar millions. Bars are
mean value at end-year for a panel of  countries, excluding the USA. The figure for  is
August.
32 Although most countries relaxed the cover limit in the s, Nurkse (, p. ) finds only two that
entirely suspended it –Germany and Italy. US Federal Reserve tabulations indicate he missed Greece.
US Federal Reserve (, ).
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flexibility, capital controls and thus more room for fiscal deficits.We come to the con-
clusion that these are not the main factors behind the cushioning of the economic
shock coming from the US. First, exchange rate flexibility was confined to a rather
small group of countries. Second, capital controls were much less tight than official
classifications suggest. And third, the fiscal room of manoeuvre of the UK govern-
ment was large enough to reconcile the rearmament programme with a stable
exchange rate against the US dollar.
This finding concurs with several recent studies on the post- international
monetary system (Straumann and Woitek ; Urban ; Wandschneider and
Wolf ; Wolf ). They all point out that the break with the gold exchange
standard of the s was less abrupt than usually assumed. Most countries, in particu-
lar the smaller ones, maintained a fixed exchange rate against their main trading part-
ners, thus being subject to the same rules the gold exchange standard had imposed
upon them. It would be wrong to claim that there was no change at all. But the
fact that enhanced reserve positions made a crucial difference between the downturns
of  and  suggests that currency devaluation – not fundamental regime
change – was the major monetary change of the s.
From a longer-term perspective, the s international monetary system evolved
in a way that connected the interwar gold standard to the Bretton Woods system
(–). It was a de facto arrangement of what would be made de jure at
Figure . Percentage decline in reserves and exchange rate (absolute value), peak-to-trough during May
 – June 
Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin, League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Economist, Global
Financial Data.
Notes: Peak/trough dates and data points are reported in Appendix . Reserves are in US dollar
terms, converted from local currency terms with bilateral US dollar exchange rate fromGlobal
Financial Data. The exchange rate is the percentage change in the bilateral rate against the US
dollar, in USD/local currency terms.
SCOTT URBAN AND TOBIAS STRAUMANN
Bretton Woods. We favour this viewpoint over the alternative that the s was a
period of floating exchange rates anticipating the modern, post-Bretton Woods
period (Eichengreen , p. ). We are not the first to cast the s system as
a forerunner of Bretton Woods. Mundell describes a dollar-based international
order which begins from stabilisation on the $ gold price in  and lasts until
 (Mundell , p. ). Eichengreen and others see traces of the Bretton
Woods system from the signing of the Tripartite Agreement in  (Eichengreen
, p. ). What we add is a quantification of that similarity. Applying our
weekly rolling variant of the Shambaugh () algorithm to a longer span of
history helps illustrate how similar the s are to the Bretton Woods system
(Figure ).
Flexible exchange rate regimes did not arrive until the early s when the
Bretton Woods system collapsed. Comparative studies on the exchange rate choices
of small European states even suggest that only with the crisis of the European
monetary system in / did the idea that small states were able to manage
floating exchange rates gain currency. Before, policymakers had been convinced
that small open economies needed fixed exchange rates as a precondition for
stable trade relations and price stability (Straumann ). Lastly, our story is a
case of history repeating itself. Just as the emerging markets and periphery
economies of the interwar years survived the – shock through a strong reserves
position, so too have the emerging markets of today weathered the – financial
crisis.
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Figure . Pegged regimes, percentage of total annual observations
Source: Urban (). Compiled from weekly observations of  countries with automatic
numeraire selection.
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Appendix . Incidence and type of currency pegging
         
Algeria g  g  g  g  g  g  g  – s  g 
Argentina – g  g  g  s  s  g  g  s  g 
Australia g  s  s  s  s  s  g  g  s  g 
Austria g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
Belgium g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
Brazil – – – s  s  g  g  g  g  g 
Canada g  g  – – g  g  g  g  g  g 
Chile g  g  g  g  – g  g  g  g  g 
China – – – – – g  g  g  g  –
Colombia g  g  g  g  – – – – g  g 
Cuba g  g  g  g  s  g  g  g  g  g 
Czech’ia g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
Denmark g  g  – s  s  s  g  g  g  g 
Egypt g  s  s  s  s  s  g  g  s  g 
Estonia g  g  g  s  s  g  g  g  g  g 
Finland g  g  – s  s  s  g  g  g  g 
France g  g  g  g  g  g  g  – s  g 
Germany g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
Greece g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
HK – – – – – – s  s  s  g 
Hungary g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
India g  s  s  s  s  s  g  g  s  g 
Indonesia g  g  g  g  g  g  s  g  g  g 
Ireland g  s  s  s  s  s  s  g  s  g 
Italy g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
Japan g  g  – s  s  s  g  g  s  g 
Latvia g  g  – – – g  g  g  g  g 
Lithuania g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
Malaysia g  s  s  s  s  s  g  g  s  g 
Mexico g  g  – – g  g  g  g  g  g 
Netherlands g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
NZ g  s  s  s  s  s  g  g  s  g 
Nigeria g  s  s  s  s  s  g  g  s  g 
Norway g  g  – s  s  s  g  g  g  g 
Philippines g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
Poland g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
Portugal g  g  – s  s  s  g  g  g  g 
Romania g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
Russia g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
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         
S Africa g  s  s  s  s  s  g  g  s  g 
Spain – – – g  g  g  g  – – g 
Sweden g  g  – s  s  s  g  g  g  g 
Switzerland g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
Turkey g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
UK g  s  s  s  s  s  g  g  s  g 
Venezuela g  – – – – g  g  g  g  g 
Yugoslavia g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g  g 
Source: Urban () based on exchange rates from Global Financial Data.
Notes: g = gold, s = sterling, –= no peg. The number in each cell reports the percentage of
weekly observations that qualify as a peg to the noted currency. For , the total
observations are  weeks to recognise the outbreak of World War II. A peg to gold means
the currency follows the US dollar through the end of , the French franc until the end of
, and the US dollar thereafter.
Appendix . Reserves, exchange rates and monetary base
Appendix a. Decline in reserves, peak-to-trough within the interval May  – June 
Max Maxdate Min Mindate % change
Brazil . m . m −.
Argentina . m . m −.
France . m . m −.
Belgium . m . m −.
New Zealand . m . m −.
Australia . m . m −.
Egypt . m . m −.
India . m . m −.
South Africa . m . m −.
Colombia . m . m −.
Sweden . m . m −.
Finland . m . m −.
Norway . m . m −.
Portugal . m . m −.
Switzerland . m . m −.
Denmark . m . m −.
Latvia . m . m −.
Estonia . m . m −.
Continued
ST ILL T IED BY GOLDEN FETTERS 
Appendix a. Continued
Max Maxdate Min Mindate % change
Poland . m . m −.
Germany . m . m −.
UK . m . m −.
Lithuania . m . m −.
Canada . m . m −.
Japan . m . m −.
Netherlands . m . m −.
Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin, League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Economist.
Note: Reserves are in US dollar millions.
Appendix b. Decline in exchange rate, peak-to-trough within the interval May  – June 
Peak Peak date Trough Trough date % change
Algeria . m . m −.
Argentina . m . m −.
Australia . m . m .
Austria . m . m −.
Belgium . m . m −.
Brazil . m . m −.
Canada . m . m −.
Chile . m . m .
China . m . m −.
Colombia . m . m −.
Cuba . m . m .
Czechoslovakia . m . m −.
Denmark . m . m −.
Egypt . m . m −.
Estonia . m . m −.
Finland . m . m −.
France . m . m −.
Germany . m . m −.
Greece . m . m −.
HK . m . m −.
Hungary . m . m −.
India . m . m −.
Indonesia . m . m −.
Ireland . m . m .
Italy . m . m .
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Peak Peak date Trough Trough date % change
Japan . m . m −.
Latvia . m . m −.
Lithuania . m . m −.
Malaysia . m . m −.
Mexico . m . m −.
Netherlands . m . m −.
New Zealand . m . m .
Nigeria . m . m .
Norway . m . m −.
Philippines . m . m −.
Poland . m . m −.
Portugal . m . m −.
Romania . m . m −.
Russia . m . m −.
South Africa . m . m .
Spain . m . m −.
Sweden . m . m −.
Switzerland . m . m −.
Turkey . m . m −.
UK . m . m −.
Venezuela . m . m −.
Yugoslavia . m . m −.
Source: Global Financial Data.
Note: Exchange rates are reported as US dollars per local currency unit.
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Appendix c. Expansion of MO over two intervals (start-to-finish)
m m m m* % change
– –
Netherlands     . .
Germany     −. .
Japan     −. .
Switzerland     . .
Canada   . . −. .
France     . .
Finland     −. .
Poland     −. .
Norway     −. .
Denmark     −. .
Estonia . . . . −. .
Lithuania     . .
USA     −. .
Austria     −. .
Sweden     . .
UK . .  . −. .
Australia . . . . . .
Chile     −. .
Colombia . . . . −. .
China   .
Latvia     . .
Portugal     . .
South Africa . . . . −. −.
India . .   −. −.
Egypt . . . −.
Belgium     . −.
Brazil     . −.
New Zealand . . . . −. −.
Argentina     −. −.
Italy   −.
Spain   .
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Economist
* Due to data availability, end dates are earlier for Austria (Feb ), Brazil (Dec ) and China
(Jul ).
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